Nylige prosjekter

Utkast til artikkel som analyserer måter man kan løse moralske dilemmaer eller konflikter på. Det legges her et særlig fokus på konflikter mellom moral og egeninteresse.

This paper intends to describe the underlying meaning explanations that grounds different approaches to normative reasoning, described in the contemporary literature on metaethics. It will do this by identifying three different general approaches for assessing conflicts between normative reasons, silencing, ranking and compositional reconstruction. In addition, we will describe how it is possible to interpret the use of different and distinct kinds of normative reasons, essential in views about normative pluralism, but also highlighted as an important distinction in other views concerning the comparison of reasons. To do this we will use a particular interpretation of intuitionistic logic, intuitionistic type theory. Since this diverges from the classical systems of deontic logic, the first part of the article will provide a justification for the utilisation of this particular framework. First, we will give a historico-philosophical background, explaining why this particular approach seems better suited for deontic notions and the developments of reasons than its classical counterpart. Then, we will continue by explaining the technical advantages of intuitionistic type theory, namely its ability to unite higher- and lower-order properties without the introduction of a distinct higher-order language. The second part of the article will describe an implementation of multiple kinds of normative reasons in the BHK-interpretation of propositions as sets, by reducing each kind to distinct canonical elements of what we will call a 'deontic proposition'. It uses this definition to describe how normative conflicts can be reduced to the logical notion of inconsistency and in doing so it distinguishes two different ways this might happen, identified as direct normative conflicts and indirect normative conflicts, and connecting this to the epistemological notions of inconsistency and incompatibility. The third part of the article identifies three ways of handling such normative conflicts, creating connections to the logical analyses of legal interpretation and argumentation. The first way to solve a normative conflict is identified as silencing, to reject one of the conflicting reasons. The second is ranking, to appeal to some standard for comparison. The third is compositional reconstruction, to revise the underlying reasons for some action. This last alternative does not by itself provide a way out of a normative conflict, but can provide new grounds for a treatment by the other approaches. We will also describe how this last approach seems essential for normative pluralism. The goal of this project is therefore to describe how one might use an intuitionistic logic to describe relevant approaches in a practical deontic logic of reasons. This connection between intuitionism and deontic logic is not new, though the most effort have been placed at identifying and describing the legal aspects deontic notions and reasoning. We will in this paper draw lines between the metaethical literature and the newer developments in intuitionism and legal reasoning and explain how many results in the area of legal reasoning seem transferable to the ethical domain, though highlighting some important differences and sketching out some ways to adjust according to the different domains.

Utkast til artikkel som problematiserer muligheten for å identifisere 'juridisk relevante likheter', utelukkende på grunn av formelle kriterier. Den foreslår så en løsning ut fra ha et eksplisitt bias, i kombinasjon med å introdusere ulike nivåer av likheter.

In Hans Christian Andersen's story 'The Ugly Duckling', the duck mother is surprised to see the strange looking duckling that came out of the big egg. It looked so different from all the other ducklings. But is it really different? By a generalisation of the Goodmans's grue/bleen challenge, Watanabe arrives at what is now known as 'the ugly duckling theorem', stating that without some prior bias, any pair is as similar to each other as any other pair. In other words, any two ducklings is as similar to each other as a duckling and a swan. Despite its rather counterintuitive result, this show that there is no objective way of measure the degree of similarity between two things. This paper intends to describe how this problem persists in the context of legal interpretation, the search 'relevant similarity' being one of its core features. In the first part it will show how this problem occurs by introducing a notion of uniquely distinguishing features. In the second part it will show that even by imposing a common formal restriction, known as the condition of efficiency or the proportionality requirement, on the similarity relations, we end up with everything being similar to everything in an infinite number of ways as long as one is clever enough to find the proper predicate. In the third part, it will sketch a solution to the given problem by describing the structure of a plausible bias and how the problem might be diminished by the introduction of higher-order interpretations and analogies. The goal of this paper is to first describe how a theoretical problem of classification actually converts into a practical issue regarding the interpretation of legal concepts. Despite its acknowledgment in the literature of computer science, this problem seems surprisingly absent in the context of law. The notion of bias involved in legal reasoning is frequently discussed in the literature, though it is not obvious that this actually solves the problem of interpretation in itself. We seem to also rely on some notion of higher-order interpretations to make this possible.

Denne artikkelen gir en beskrivelse av  juridiske analogier og bruk av tidligere dommer på et algoritmisk nivå. Den forklarer hvordan dette kan implementeres ved introduksjonen av avhengige typer, da dette muliggjør en sammenkobling av første- og høyereordens egenskaper. 

With the Curry-Howard isomorphism, we are provided with a connection between logic and programming language, essential for the implementation of the given type-theoretical analysis to computer-assisted legal reasoning. By sugaring a type-theoretical description of the meaning explanations that lies behind analogies in the legal context, we describe an implementation of a testing procedure for case-based reasoning in a programming language with dependent types. The notion of dependent types is particular, though essential for this particular analysis as it is what enables us to not only consider the content of analogical arguments, but also how analogies might be used as themselves content in other analogical arguments. Such use of analogies to establish legal certainty often occurs in the legal context as an interpretation might themselves depend on other interpretations. These kinds of structures have shown difficult to represent in most current logical analyses of analogies and CTT by its notion of dependent types has previously shown to be a powerful tool in capturing such dependencies. Contrary to many other computer applications in law, this is not a procedure for estimating results in future legal cases, but it is a way to encapsulate the body of the law, namely its ratio. These are of course not independent questions, though the goal is not only to predict future decisions based on earlier decided cases. 

Jeg er forfatter av denne boken som beskriver og sammenlikner ulike logiske og datavitenskapelige analyser av analogisk argumentasjon i en juridisk kontekst for så å gi en selvstendig analyse i et dialogisk typeteoretisk rammeverk som løser mange av utfordringene med de beskrevne analysene. Det teoretiske grunnlaget for denne tekniske analysen gis ved å ta utgangspunkt i Aristoteles' begrep om proporsjonalitet, Leibniz' analyse av juridiske kondisjonaler, samt moderne utviklinger innen datalingvistikk og formelle juridiske modeller, og inkluderer samtidig en ny restriksjon for analogisk argumentasjon, ikke kjent for å være beskrevet i noen tidligere logiske analyser. (426 sider) ISBN: 9781848903913 

An analogy can be understood as two things that are similar to each other and as a foundation for argumentation, they play an essential role in most, if not all, legal systems. Provided here, is an investigation of the underlying assumptions and requirements that ground good analogical arguments. Based on the Aristotelian analysis of proportionality, analogies are represented in the framework of immanent reasoning, enabling the inclusion of what has been identified as initial conditions. This is a new feature not known from any other logical representations. 

First is the explication of a general meaning structure behind legal analogies across the legal systems of Common and Civil Law, situated in the intersection of current discussions within logic, law and computer science. In the further dialogical interpretation, eight different forms of analogies are distinguished and a comprehensive and even more refined analysis of the newly introduced initial conditions arise. The framework is then concretely applied both to the well-known Common Law example of Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. and to three different Supreme Court decisions concerning the responsibility of paying the Tax on Documented Legal Acts from Spanish Civil Law.

Through both a general overview of the current challenges and solutions related to analogy in legal reasoning, as well as an independent analysis of analogy, this very complex concept is explained in a simple and natural way, closely related to actual legal practice. The given analyses are highly interdisciplinary, uniting historico-philosophical reflections, recent computer scientific developments and applied legal argumentation.

Denne artikkelen (fagfellevurdert) viser en generell struktur for å benytte Leibniz' analyse av juridiske kondisjonaler for å representere analogiske argumenter i Martin-Löfs typeteori. Artikkelen viser så hvordan denne analysen kan benyttes for å beskrive en programmerbar prosedyre for analogisk argumentasjon fra et kunstig-intelligensperspektiv. Dette er en tverrfaglig artikkel som er i skjæringspunktet mellom logikk, jus og kunstig intelligens. (30 sider) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-70084-3_9

This article intends to approach a structure for representing analogical reasoning in law by utilising the Constructive Type-theoretical framework developed by Martin-Löf (1984), called Immanent Reasoning, developed in Rahman et al. (2018). This is done by taking the formulation of legal conditionals, as introduced and described in Rahman and Granström (2019), to represent the notion of a case and by embedding one formulation inside another, we can represent the dependency that we find of the decision of the target case on the decision in the source cases. This representation enables us to include the condition of efficiency, described in Rahman, Iqbal and Soufi (2019), that we want to impose on analogical reasoning. By using such formulation, we can represent not only the dependency of a certain analogical decision, but also use it to describe how different situations in the source cases can have different legal consequences in the target case.

Sammen med Maria Dolors Martínez-Cazalla, Tania Menéndez-Martín and Shahid Rahman er jeg forfatter av denne artikkelen (fagfellevurdert) og anvender en dialogisk tilnærming til typeteori på bruken av analogier i et konkret eksempel fra Spansk skattelovgivning. Denne artikkelen knytter da den teoretiske analysen sammen med juridisk praksis og forklarer hvordan slike metoder ikke bare er et verktøy innen kunstig intelligens, men hvordan det også kan anvendes for et konkret juridisk eksempel. Min rolle i denne artikkelen var i utgangspunktet relatert til den teoretiske analysen av eksempelet og for min del har et slikt bidrag vært viktig for å utvikle gode rutiner for samarbeid og arbeidsfordeling for forskning. (37 sider) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-70084-3_10

Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman et al. (2019) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory (CTT) to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiya ̄s or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary Common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment of the dialogical framework developed within Civil and Common Law. After a presentation of Scott Brewer’s take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasoning by precedent case rooted in ratio legis (known in Islamic Jurisprudence as qiya ̄s al-‘illa or correlational inference by the occasioning factor), we will illustrate the implementation of the framework with a brief discussion of some cases of legal reasoning based in Spanish Civil Law, but where the accent is put in the emerging ruling rather than in the existing of a case as in Common Law. Moreover; quite surprisingly, the case under study suggests that even cases of Law-interpretation fit the argumentation pattern of qiya ̄s al-‘illa. The present paper is a follow-up of the paper “Parallel Reasoning by Ratio Legis in Contemporary Jurisprudence. Elements for a Dialogical Approach” by M. D. Martínez-Cazalla, T. Menéndez-Martín & S. Rahman (2021). More precisely, the present paper works out the details of the dialogical structure studied there by those authors. Spelling out the dialogical structure stresses the reasoning patterns shared by classical Islamic Jurisprudence and contemporary Law.